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INCARNATION IN THE GOSPELS AND 
THE BHAGAVAD GITA 
Diogenes Allen 
This article is a venture into a Christian Theology of Other Faiths. In contrast to History of 
Religions, which seeks to understand a religion from its own point of view, a Christian 
Theology of Other Faiths seeks to understand another religion from the perspective of 
the Christian revelation. 
Here I present Simone Weil's claim that the Word of God is manifest in human form in 
other faiths, and that the Gospels are written from the point of view of a victim, and are 
completed by the Bhagavad Gila which is written from the point of view of an agent who 
wields a sword. 
Pluralism-whether racial, ethnic, or cultural-has forced Christians to rethink 
their understanding of the gospel. One major area in which this is happening is in 
relation to other religions. There is a pressing need to develop a Christian under-
standing of other faiths, a way for Christians to make a valid place for them within 
their own faith. 
But when this is attempted, a dilemma is encountered. There is a widespread 
desire to understand other religions as valid and significant revelations. Christians 
can go quite far in this direction, but they cannot apparently relinquish the claim 
that Christ is the savior of the world. If Christ were our savior only, he would be 
a parochial god; and that for Christians is impossible. He is either the one who 
died for the sins of the world or he is apparently not a savior at all. So we can either 
maintain Christ's uniqueness and indispensability for human redemption and thus 
appear to condemn other faiths as inadequate for salvation~r we can accept 
others ways to God as equally valid at the cost of giving up Christ as the prime and 
indispensable mediator of redemption. Both alternatives have been proposed, but 
neither seems to be satisfactory. 
I believe Simone Weil avoids both horns of this dilemma. I attempted to show 
this in a previous article in which I presented her understanding of how the Cross 
was universally present in the form of affliction. By focusing on the Cross she 
was able to take the most distinctive aspect of Christianity and to show a vital 
connection between it and the faith of other peoples.! 
In this paper I wish to focus on Weil's claim that there are two incarnations: 
the Word of God as the principle that organizes all creation, and the Word of God 
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that became man. This focus will enable us to make still another vital connection 
between Christianity and other religions of the world; for Weil believed that the 
Word has been manifest in human form in other religions. She maintains, how-
ever, that the Word of God that became Jesus Christ differs in two crucial respects 
from manifestations of the Word in human form in other faiths. In Jesus Christ the 
Word becomes a man and remains a man. The Word does not temporarily assume 
a human form and then discard it. In addition, Jesus suffers and dies. This is not 
true of other manifestations of the Word of God. 
The other manifestations, however, do bring out features that are only implicit in 
the Cross of Christ. They are important for us Christians because they make ex-
plicit what otherwise remains hidden in our own religion. They deepen our under-
standing of the atonement effected by Christ's incarnation and death. We shall 
illustrate this claim by discussing Weil's understanding of the Bhagavad-Gita. 
The existence of other faiths need not continue to erode our Christian faith, leading 
some theologians, such as John Hick, to treat the incarnation in a merely symbolic 
fashion, or to reduce Christ to the status of a savior only for those who follow the 
route he opened to God (his route being only one of many possible routes). Weil' s 
fragmentary ideas, which I have here reconstructed, do not solve all our diffi-
culties, but they can stimulate us to think in new ways about the problems and 
opportunities other faiths pose for us. 
I. The Atonement Wrought by Christ 
Weil's method of reasoning in religious matters is to focus on what is contradic-
tory in earthly terms in order to lever ourselves above them into the realm of super-
natural truth. She writes, for example, "It is a contradiction that God who is infinite, 
who is all, to whom nothing is lacking, should do something that is outside himself, 
that is not himself, while at the same time proceeding from himself."2 That is to 
say, God inexplicably creates the universe. Every kind of human and animal 
motivation-such as lack, need, or instability-is not a reason for God to create 
something that is not himself, since an infinite, peIfect being lacks nothing or 
needs nothing which cannot be supplied from within himself, and as peIfect, he 
is not forced by any instability to act. It is only a contradiction, however, on 
the plane of human and animal motivation. A contradiction for Weil (as for Plato 
and Pascal) pressures us to rise to a higher level to gain understanding, which 
in this instance is the level of grace, which is a supernatural motive. At this 
level there is no contradiction between motive and action. There is a harmony 
between the motive of peIfect love and the creation of something outside oneself 
because creation is an utterly free gift. 
Frequently Weil focuses on those matters which, because they are contradictory 
on a non-religious plane, open the mind to receive supernatural or religious truth. 
INCARNATION, GOSPELS, AND GITA 243 
A religious understanding does not remove all mystery, however. For example, 
the notion of grace-an utterly free gift-enables us to understand God's motive 
in creating what is not himself. It does not enable us to understand how God 
creates, that is, the nature of the divine causality which produces finite existence. 
None of the forms of causality that exist between members of the universe, such 
as sexual generation or mechanical impact of one thing on another, is the relation 
between God and the entire universe. The relations between the members of the 
universe and that between God and the entire universe are at best only analogous. 
They enable us to compare God's creation of the heavens and earth to other 
kinds of making. But we do not comprehend the nature of divine causality itself: 
we can think only in terms of likeness or similarities to natural kinds of making. 
The contradiction, then, between a Being who is utterly complete and who 
nonetheless creates something outside himself-a contradiction because no 
human or animal motive could be the reason for an infinite God to create 
something that is not himself-though resolved by the supernatural motive of 
perfect love, does not remove the mystery of how he creates. Motives or reasons 
for an action do not reveal the means by which an action is carried out. 
In the same way Wei! writes of another mystery, the incarnation. "The supreme 
contradiction is the creator-creature contradiction, and it is Christ who represents 
the union of these contradictories. '" Because we and God are on different levels, 
contact between us is impossible. The incarnation of God makes it possible. The 
incarnate God is simultaneously God and yet he is on our level because he is 
human. In addition, the incarnate one can raise us to the level of the Father, 
because by making us holy or righteous, he raises us to the level of divine 
holiness or righteousness. The incarnation, which removes the contradiction that 
exists in the notion of contact between beings which are on completely different 
levels-an infinite and holy being and finite and sinful beings---does not enable 
us to understand how God became a man. That an incarnation gives us a 
mediator-something in between the transcendent God and us which allows for 
contact between the transcendent and the human---does not reveal to us how 
divinity and humanity are combined in a single being who is both fully divine 
and fully human. 
Contact between God and human beings requires that two chasms be spanned. 
(1) As we have seen, the infinite creator is a being on a different level from that 
of creatures. The incarnation of the Word of God brings God down to the human 
level. (2) God is perfect in righteousness or justice (the Greek word in the New 
Testament has both meanings). We are not. Christ raises us to the level of God 
by making us righteous or just. It is this feature of traditional Christian theology-
its most distinctive feature-which Weil paradoxically uses to create a vital link 
with other faiths. Let us first see how she understands Christ's work of atonement 
and then we shall see how she ties it to a Christian understanding of other faiths. 
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The key to understanding the way Christ is the mediator between unrighteous 
creatures and the holy, uncreated source of all is to be found in Wei!'s pregnant 
remark, "We must ask that all the evil we do may fall solely and directly on 
ourselves. That is the Cross."4 Many Christians are prone to accept too quickly 
Christ as the bearer of our sins and evil. But if we seek to be just, and to demand 
justice, then we ought in consistency to ask that all the evil we do may fall 
solely and directly on ourselves. That thought is too horrible to bear, but to think 
it is to gain access to what the Cross involves. Let us see how. 
Contact or atonement for Wei! means that we are to be assimilated to God. 
That is, we are to be made similar or like God. In order to bring together what 
is so disparate as God and human beings, there must be a mediator. Christ as a 
perfectly just man or righteous man is like God. 
Weil points out that in the Phaedrus, Plato tells a myth in which all intelligent 
creatures partake of food that resides in a realm which transcends the universe. 
They consume the reality of which this world is but a reflection. They nourish 
themselves with truth itself, justice itself, reason itself, and the other realities. 
This is indeed strange language, but I believe that we may say that by justice 
itself what is meant is perfect justice. Moreover, perfect justice is a divine 
attribute. No human being, even the most just is perfectly just. Perfection cannot 
be reached by adding more of the same to what we are. 
Wei I uses Plato's myth to bring out the fact that there is not merely a quantitative 
difference between the creator and creatures, but a qualitative difference. 5 Perfect 
justice is not achieved by improving our behavior. Perfect justice is not a human 
characteristic. This may become evident to us if we meditate on the fact that we 
do not desire that all our evil fall solely and directly on ourselves. We flee from 
the thought. On the other hand, were God to be incarnate as a human being he 
would be a perfectly just or righteous man. This is why Weil wrote, "Therefore 
in spite of the fact that he was on earth, he would belong to those realities which 
lie on the other side of the sky."6 
We may find another link to her understanding of the atonement Christ wrought 
by use of mathematical proportion as an analogy, with Christ as the mean term. 
We may say that God is to the God-man as the God-man is to us. That is, in 
relation to God he is perfectly obedient (righteous), and in relation to us, the 
righteous man is the way we ought to be. We become assimilated to God by 
becoming assimilated to his righteousness. Through the incarnate Word of God's 
obedience, we may become perfectly obedient to God. 
We do not become assimilated to God without a love of justice itself. When 
we are treated fairly, we do not love justice itself, because we find the treatment 
pleasant. Our attention is occupied by pleasure so that we do not attend to the 
goodness of justice itself. When we are treated unfairly, we are indirectly aware 
of the good of justice. We realize that justice matters because of the harm we 
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suffer from injustice. But we do not yet love justice itself. To love it is to desire 
to become perfectly just, that is, to be assimilated to what we love. A way to 
test whether we do love justice itself, rather than demanding it because we desire 
other goods or because through injustice we suffer harm, is to ask God that our 
evil fall solely and directly on ourselves. That would be to love justice itself. 
To reflect on this possibility honestly makes us aware of the fact that we also 
desire to be saved/rom justice. To a person caught in such a contradiction-loving 
justice and yet fearful of it-the need for a supernatural remedy is apparent. 
In suffering there is a place where God and human beings may meet. God, 
as transcendent creator, cannot suffer as we do. He becomes a man so that he 
is able to suffer as we suffer. The incarnate one saves us from having to bear 
the full consequences of justice by submitting to an unjust execution. He thus 
bears the consequences of God's mercy and forgiveness in his own person and 
he mediates the consequences of our evil into the very being of God; for God 
endures the separation from himself of his beloved son, the incarnate, crucified 
Word of God. 
To love justice itself, so that we ask that our evil fall solely and directly on 
ourselves, and yet to shrink in horror from it, is the way we are assimilated to 
God. Justice puts us into a contradictory situation; it leads us to look to a reality 
which is on a higher level for relief. Faith is to believe that we can be raised 
and belong to a transcendent realm by attending to God incarnate, a righteous 
one who suffers unjustly. Faith is to believe that to love a righteous one, who 
is justice itself incarnate, makes us just, because we become like what we love. 
Faith is to believe that a desire for justice itself brings us nearer to it. 7 
II. The Word of God as the Ordering Principle of the World 
Weil claims that the Word of God is the ordering principle of the world. This 
is a traditional notion in Christian theology. In Genesis 1 chaos is ordered into 
a cosmos by the Word of God; and John's Gospel begins with an identification 
of the Word of God with Jesus Christ. Weil's contribution is to show that the 
created world can be a medium for contact between God, who is the transcendent 
creator, and human beings. 8 
Weil (as others before her, notably Leibniz and Whitehead) was struck by 
Plato's remark in the Timaeus that the cosmos is the result of "good persuading 
necessity." This obscure remark can be understood by means of the Greek notion 
of "limit." The cosmos-which in Greek means an ordered world in contrast to 
chaos-is the result of limits being placed on things so that we do not have 
amorphous stuff, but specific things. To be a thing is to be limited, and the 
relations between things is the result of limitation. For example, the height to 
which waves wash up onto a shore is determined precisely by several factors, 
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such as the shape and slope of the coastline. Waves can go only so far and then 
they reach their limit. The introduction of limitation, which is the introduction 
of necessity, gives us a cosmos, rather than chaos. 
Nature, however, is not to be understood simply in terms of necessary relations 
between its members. Things in nature have been given their specific limits with 
the intention of producing a harmonious whole, so that the universe is good as 
a whole and in every part. This is evident in the beauty of the universe as a 
whole and in every part, a beauty which is caused by nature's laws, but which 
is not intended by nature's laws. For Plato, the beauty of the world points beyond 
the necessary relations between the members of the universe to a Mind which 
orders the universe with the intention of producing beauty. (We should also 
remember that in ancient Greek the word "kalos" means either good or beautiful). 
Weil interprets the Christian claim that God creates the world by and through 
his Word to mean that his Word is the principle of limitation or necessity that 
structures the world, and orders things so structured into a harmonious whole. 
His Word is the principle of its overall, harmonious order, which is spelled out 
in detail by our present-day sciences in the formulation of regularities as laws 
of nature. Nature's obedience to the Word of God is experienced by us as 
necessity. Weil calls the principle of nature's order an incarnation of the Word 
of God, and the beauty of the world its smile. 
This is not an incarnation in precisely the same sense that Jesus is the incarnation 
of the Word of God because the Word of God is not identified with the cosmos 
of matter and energy. The world is not the Word of God; it is the continuous 
effect of his Word. God is indirectly present to us through and in the world as 
the principle of its overall order. This implies that he can be experienced by us 
indirectly or implicitly as we understand .the world's laws by our intellects, as 
we perceive its beauty by our senses, and as we feel the effects of the operations 
of nature on our bodies. 
For indirect contact with God through nature to elevate us, that is to mediate 
his purifying presence (so that we are assimilated to him by being made righteous 
or just) we must attend to nature in the right way. This is also true with God's 
presence in Christ. As we have just seen, for contact with Christ to assimilate 
us to God, we must hunger and thirst for justice.9 Only so do we love him, the 
perfectly righteous one who was unjustly slain. For contact with God to take 
place through nature, we must rise out of our particular point of view and come 
to love nature as a whole. The natural world for all its beauty and goodness also 
injures us by its operations, causing pain, suffering, decay, and finally death. 
In its operations it does not make any allowance for our personal merits or 
demerits. As Jesus noted, God "makes the sun to rise on the good and evil, and 
sends rain on the just and unjust" (Matt. 5:45b). Nature operates with complete 
indifference, making no distinction between people. If we are to have contact 
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with God through nature, we must rise above an anthropocentric and an egocentric 
point of view. This means to accept the indifference of nature and the injury it 
does to human beings and to us personally. This is a bitter truth to accept because 
nature destroys so much that is precious to us. But to come to terms with our 
vulnerability to nature is to come to terms with the truth about ourselves: we 
are natural beings and, like all natural beings, we are mortal and vulnerable to 
disease, accidents, and natural catastrophes. Were it not for the beauty of the 
universe, which is the effect of the operation of its necessities, we could not 
love it. But in loving nature, we are drawn out of our anthropocentricity and 
egocentricity. We are elevated or purified by our attentiveness to the beauty of 
the world because by attending to its overall harmony, we are in contact with 
God. Then "each sensation is like communion, that of pain included."10 
To understand this more fully we must consider once again Weil's idea that 
contradiction on one level can enable us to reach a higher, supernatural level, 
which makes sense of the opposition. In Gravity and Grace Weil writes, "The 
word good has not the same meaning when it is a term of the corelation good-evil 
as when it describes the very being of God."" Necessity or compulsion, which 
nature exercises on our bodies, is not the divine goodness that orders nature. In 
fact, compulsion is the very opposite of divine goodness. But we are unaware 
of divine goodness until we recognize that nature's necessities produce both 
goods and evils. The order of nature is responsible both for sunshine and rain, 
good health and illness, growth and decay, life and death. Nature in its operations 
gives us both members of the pair "good-evil." As long as nature gives us good 
things personally (for example, good health), we do not notice that we are as 
much subject to compulsion (necessity) in those instances as we are in those in 
which bad things happen to us (for example, illnesses). We notice nature's 
necessities or compulsion only in the negativities of life, in things which are 
bad for us. Then of course the problem of reconciling belief in a good God with 
the existence of evil seems well-nigh impossible, and in addition we then do not 
have even a notion that divine goodness is not identical with the good in the 
pair "good-evil," which flows from nature's operation. Only when we see that 
nature operates by necessity and that it is indifferent to our welfare and causes 
both good and evil, that we can even conceive of the possibility of one whose 
goodness is beyond the pair "good-evil." When we face the truth of nature's 
indifference, and accept our vulnerability to its operations, then we know in our 
very bones that the good we crave-happiness or well-being-is not to be found 
in this world. 
The conviction that there is a transcendent good arises from actual contact 
with it. When we are able to love nature as a whole-not just the good parts-we 
come into contact with the transcendent good. We come into contact with the 
transcendent good that orders nature's necessities into a harmonious whole when 
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we look beyond the goods and evils-the sun and rain-which result from the 
operation of nature. As long as our attention, desires, and hearts are set on the 
goods which have evils as their counterpart, we are not open to contact with 
God through nature. Nature is ordered by the transcendent good to lead us to 
God by our recognition that we are under compulsion from nature and that our 
good cannot be found in nature but from the creator of nature. God does not 
give an order to nature which produces an earthly paradise for human beings. 
In their treatment of the problem of evil many modem philosophers, especially 
David Hume in his classic Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, point to pain 
and suffering to show that a benevolent intelligence did not design the world. 
Hume claims that it is easy to conceive of a better ordered world than ours. The 
criterion of "better," however, is one which produces more goods and fewer 
evils in the pair "good-evil" which flow from nature's operations. The verdict 
on the goodness of God is determined by the ratio between the members of the 
pair "good-evil." But it is precisely the contradiction or opposition between 
necessity, which is the source of the pair good-evil, and God, who is good, that 
can lift us above nature to a transcendent good. Nature's indifference can lever 
us upward by breaking our anthropocentric and egocentric perspectives. If we 
humbly accept the truth that we are under the compulsion of nature, our 
anthropocentric and egocentric illusions are broken and we are in contact with 
reality. That puts us into indirect contact with God, the ordering principle of 
nature, whether we realize it or not. 
Contradictions, then, are resolved on a higher plane, but only by intuition, 
that is, by experience, in contrast to discursive argument. It is achieved by facing 
the contradiction fearlessly. There are moments of horror in facing the indifference 
of nature's compulsion, since necessity is contrary to the good we seek. In our 
distress we cannot look for solace to a member of the pair "good-evil," since 
the pair flows from necessity itself. There is an interval of horror in which we 
have a sense of being utterly abandoned by all possibility of good. Christ felt 
abandoned on the Cross as he experienced the compulsion of force and death, 
and cried out, "My God, my God, why hast thou forsaken me?" But if we endure 
the horror of necessity, God becomes present to us. If we patiently wait for good 
to be done to us, we shall actually find ourselves being purged of evil precisely 
in proportion to our attentiveness to the necessities of nature. In that attentiveness 
we are in contact with God through contact with the realities of creation, both 
human and natural. Contact with God is purifying automatically, and we experi-
ence the relief of being rid of the burden of evil and the joy of being filled with 
charity. 
For this reason Wei! writes, "The sense of our wretchedness is the sense of 
reality. For we do not invent our wretchedness. It is true. That is why we have 
to value it. All the rest is imaginary. "12 Likewise she notes, "The tremendous 
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greatness of Christianity comes from the fact that it does not seek a supernatural 
remedy against suffering, but a supernatural use of suffering."l3 For we may use 
our suffering caused by human actions, whether it be inflicted justly or unjustly, 
to tum our attention to him who suffered unjustly. Likewise, we may use our 
suffering at the hands of nature's necessities. To submit to nature as God's 
creature is to obey God in a fashion that is analogous to the way nature is 
perfectly obedient to God. The transcendent good (God) orders nature by his 
Word. Nature operating as it does is being obedient to his Word. We are disobe-
dient when we seek our well-being or fulfillment from the goods that are members 
of the pair "good-evil," especially when we injure others by acting unjustly. Part 
of becoming obedient is to consent to or accept nature's indifference by seeing 
that the good and evil its regularities cause spring from the same necessity. To 
have contact with necessity is to have contact through it with its Lord. And to 
seek a good that is beyond the good and evil that the created order-both human 
and natural-provides, is to desire God. Through experience we learn that so 
to desire God draws us to him, assimilates us to him. Nature is thus a mediator 
through the incarnate Word which orders it and we have contact with God by 
our willing obedience to nature's laws. 
That obedience is based not on the good that nature's order throws our way, 
nor the good that falls our way as the results of the interplay of human actions. 
The transcendent God, the good that he is, is what we regard, not the good or 
evil which is tossed our way. By our attention to what is above we rise toward 
God; we become assimilated to him; we have an "at-onement." We thus belong 
to a different order from the necessities of nature or the interplay of human 
action. By our obedience, we belong to his Kingdom or rule. This is not to say 
that we are indifferent to human pain and to human injustice. Quite the contrary, 
it is precisely because we are becoming assimilated to God that we can act more 
truthfully (and hence more fearlessly) in human affairs, since we have a degree 
of detachment from the pluses and minuses that result from the world's natural 
and human operations. 
III. Incarnation and Atonement in the Bhagavad Gita 
There are two major sacred epics in Hinduism, the Ramayana and the 
Mahabharata, which tell the stories of the heroes of the Aryan race. Numerous 
additions and interpolations have been made to both of them. The Bhagavad 
Gita ("the Song of the Lord") is one of the additions to the Mahabharata. The 
Gita consists of a long dialogue between Arjuna and his charioteer, who is 
actually Krishna, an incarnation of Vishnu (the supreme being), just before a 
great battle. Arjuna sees many of his kinsmen and friends in the ranks of the 
opposing army and is filled with horror. He does not want to fight but, it is his 
250 Faith and Philosophy 
duty to fight to protect others of his own people. His charioteer explains that 
salvation or union with ultimate reality is to be reached not only through asceti-
cism, the renunciation of the world, but also through action that is in accord 
with dharma (which means roughly to fulfill the obligations which go with a 
person's place in human society), provided that the action is done with detachment 
and is offered to Krishna in a spirit of devotion or love (bhakti). The Gita became 
the most popular of all the sacred Hindu writings because it stresses the love of 
a personal god and because it opens a path to salvation in addition to that of 
asceticism and scholarship, the classic paths to salvation in the Upanishads. 
As we shall see, there are vital differences in the understanding of incarnation 
and salvation in Christianity and Hinduism largely because there is some unclarity 
concerning the relation between the Creator and creature in Hinduism. Nonethe-
less, the incarnation and crucifixion of Christ and the story of Krishna and Arjuna 
address the same question: How may we rise above the level of the mixture of 
good and evil to the level of righteousness or purity so that there is union with 
God? In the Gospels Christ is a victim and, as we have seen, we may achieve 
assimilation to God with Christ as our mediator by love of that righteous incarnate 
one who suffers because of our unrighteousness. In the Gila Arjuna must wield 
the sword and slay his opponents-kinsmen, friends, and foes-indiscriminately. 
Yet Christ the victim and Arjuna the warrior are vitally alike in that both suffer 
from the effects of force. "Contact with force, from whichever end the contact 
is made (sword handle or sword point) deprives one for a moment of God. 
Whence the Bhagavad Gita. The Bhagavad Gita and the Gospels complete each 
other. "14 
Force or compulsion has the power to tum us into things, that is, for a moment 
to reduce us wholly to items in the flow of causes and effects, both as victims 
and as users of force. We find ourselves facing cold necessity, which of itself 
operates blindly. It cuts us off from any contact with good, whether it be the 
good in the pair "good-evil" or a transcendent good. This is why Christ in 
Gethsemane and Arjuna before a battle both shrink in horror before it. Just as 
Christ must submit to the necessity of crucifixion and become integrated into 
the flow of causes and effects, so too must Arjuna overcome his pity for those 
whom he must fight, and as a wielder of force, he must become integrated into 
the flow of causes and effects. 
Jesus provoked the religious authorities of his day and, through them, the 
political authorities. Once events were in train, there was no recourse for him 
but to suffer penal execution. Christ believed that to submit to this chain of 
causes and effects, to necessity, was his Father's will, and so he yielded to his 
will. Arjuna is also in severely constraining circumstances. Whether he fights 
or refuses to fight, there will be evil consequences. He thus forces the question, 
How can an individual become righteous when to live in society means that an 
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individual's actions, whatever they are, will have both good and evil conse-
quences? The pair "good-evil" are produced by human action in a way that is 
similar to the pair "good-evil" which is produced by the operations of nature. 
Arjuna's situation is nicely rendered by Reinhold Niebuhr's title, Moral Man in 
Immoral Society. 
In the midst of this highly circumscribed situation Krishna brings enlightenment 
to Arjuna. Just as Jesus consented to necessity, because it was his Father's will, 
so too Arjuna is to consent to being a warrior. He is to submit to obligation as 
to a necessity, 15 because at that moment there is no other course of action 
possible. 16 
There is, however, a clear recognition that even should society be altered and 
made more just, our actions have consequences, which are always a mixture of 
good and evil. In seeking to fulfill our obligations, we shall be caught in situations 
similar to the one Arjuna faced. No matter how we act-that is, whether we 
take part or refuse to take part in society--there will be both good and evil 
consequences. Thus even when we decide to fulfill our obligations, righteousness 
cannot be achieved merely by meeting our obligations. This does not mean that 
our obligations are of no significance. Krishna reveals that as we meet our 
obligations we are to be detached from our actions and devoted to him, that is, 
as we meet our obligations our aim is to be united to righteousness or justice itself. 
To rely on Krishna is to go beyond the domain of moral obligation proper. It 
is similar to the Christian notion that we rely on Christ's righteousness. But the 
concept of detachment from the consequences of our actions is unfamiliar to 
Christians and Westerners. Christians and Westerners recognize that our attitudes 
and motives are very important, but we do not think that our attitudes and motives 
are all that matters. We must, therefore, examine Weil's interpretation of "detach-
ment" in the Gita to see how she sustains her claim that the Gita completes the 
Gospels by treating righteousness from the point of view of one who wields the 
sword in contrast to the Gospels which look at righteousness from the point of 
view of one who suffers the effects of force. 
To grasp Weil's interpretation of "detachment" we need first to consider her 
interpretation of the Hindu doctrine that the self-the atman-is identical with 
ultimate reality, Brahma. According to Weil, all of us perceive things from our 
own point of view, which is not only partial but also deeply distorted by our 
wishes and desires, so that most of our thoughts and actions are not in touch 
with reality. We do not perceive things as they are. One way to achieve liberation 
from this false perspective is to recognize and accept nature's indifference. As 
we have seen, nature in its operations makes no distinction between people. If 
we accept this bitter truth-accept our vulnerability to nature-we escape from 
our anthropocentricity and egocentricity. The entire universe becomes like the 
stick a blind man uses. Through the stick a blind man has contact with that 
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which is beyond the circumference of his body. With it he is in touch with what 
is beyond it. He is moreover able to interpret or read the significance of what 
he touches by means of his stick. 
This analogy is a crucial one for Weil. The universe as a whole, when we 
accept that it operates by necessity, and thus is indifferent to our weal or woe, 
becomes for us like an extension of our selves. The universe becomes identified 
with us as an extension of us. We put ourselves in contact with what is beyond 
the realm of necessity through the universe, as a blind man puts himself in touch 
with what is beyond himself through his stick. By achieving a detachment from 
our egocentric and our anthropocentric perspectives our true selves are liberated; 
our true selves achieve a kind of identity with the universe as a whole. That 
enables us to have contact with ultimate reality. Our souls thus achieve a union 
with Brahma. Thus Weil writes, 
The Atman-Iet the soul of a man take the whole universe for its 
body ... Let the whole universe be for me, in relation to my body, 
what the stick of a blind man is in relation to his hand. His sensibility 
really no longer resides in his hand, but at the end of the stick ... We 
do not become detached, we must attach ourselves to the All. The world. 
is a text containing several meanings, and we pass from one meaning 
to another by an effort-an effort in which the body always participates, 
just as when we are learning the alphabet of a foreign language this 
alphabet has got to enter into our hand by dint of forming the charac-
ters . . . Apart from that, any change in the manner of thinking is 
illusory. "17 
Detachment thus does not mean indifference. Rather it is a freedom from 
illusions about what the world is and attachment to a reality that is not the world 
itself. 
This identification with Brahma through the universe cannot be sustained. 
Disruption arises because one must continue to act as an individual and because 
one is not the only individual. The Gita deals with both: our need to act and 
our relation to other people. IS 
The urge to achieve identification with the universe causes every person and 
every group of people to feel that they have a just and legitimate claim to be 
masters of the universe-to possess it. 19 But this possession must be properly 
understood. Because our body is finite and through it we have identification 
with the whole universe, many different people through their finite bodies may 
possess the whole without interfering with each other.20 But when the urge to 
possess is misunderstood it puts people at odds. Rather than recognizing the 
reality of other people's existence-their irreducible points of view-we seek 
to change their reading. 
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There are two ways of changing for other people the way in which they 
understand their relation to the universe: force and education. Thus Wei! writes, 
"to force somebody to read himself as you read him (slavery). To force others 
to read you as you read yourself (conquest)."21 By force one may degrade other 
people, but by education one can raise them. They then recognize that each of 
us has a point of view that is irreducible to that of others (force only destroys 
a perspective) and that each of us can have an identity with the universe and 
contact with ultimate reality without our point of view being the only point of 
view. Thus Weil asks rhetorically, "Is it not perhaps true that conquest is nothing 
other than a bad way of seeking for the Atman identical with Brahma? Man 
needs to be alone in the universe in order to be identical with the universe. (But 
if he is alone thanks to suppressing others, he is the only perspective)."22 
Weil thus connects war and the various forms of domination and suppression 
that exist in human relations to a misunderstood urge to find our true selves. 
We tend to heighten our sense of uniqueness and importance by eliminating 
other perspectives, that is by having others read us as we would like ourselves 
to be read, and by reading others as we want to read them. War, the theme of 
the Gita, is an extreme form of forcing others to read as one would have them read. 
What is particularly horrible about war is that brute compulsion or necessity 
utterly deprives us of contact with God, just as suffering from the hands of 
nature's painful operations for a time snaps our identification with the universe. 
We are out of touch with our true selves, and even deprived of the good in the 
pair "good-evil." 
However just the cause of the conqueror may be, however just that of 
the conquered, the evil caused, whether by victory or defeat, is nonethe-
less inevitable. It is useless to hope to escape from it. That is why Christ 
did not come down from the Cross, and did not even remember, at the 
moment of supreme anguish, that he would return to life. That is why 
the other one [Arjuna] did not lay down arms and stop the battle. 23 
Under the impact of necessity-whether at the point of a sword or at its hilt-man 
loses himself, God, the universe, everything. 24 
What is of particular interest is that Arjuna is to make war even though he is 
inspired by God (in contrast, for example, to Joan of Arc who makes war because 
she is inspired by God).25 At the moment when Arjuna reacts with horror to the 
situation he is in, circumstances are such that his obligations to his own people 
mean that he must fight, in spite of the effects of war on himself and on those 
against whom he must fight. Arjuna encounters in the most extreme form the 
reality of force and the reality of life in society which obliges us in our actions 
to cause both members of the pair "good-evil." 
There are, however, two different ways to kill: not knowing that those whom 
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one kills exist, except as "things-to-be killed"; and with detachment, so that one 
is not present in the action. 26 Detachment requires that one act under duress or by 
necessity. Thus Weil writes, "A harmful action which I cannot avoid accom-
plishing, except by accomplishing another even greater one-it is not I who accom-
plish it, it is Necessity."27 One becomes in effect a thing in the flow of causes and 
effects, which is ruled by necessity. "We are not defiled by actions from which we 
are absent in this fashion ... in spite of the fact that they are mixed up with evil. 
We must likewise be absent from good. Act not for a certain object, but because 
we cannot do otherwise. 28 
Our intentions in war reveal what the action is which we perform. Weil mentions 
three possible kinds of war. One kind seeks to create in the enemy a disposition to 
obey the wishes of a particular nation, always, and whatever these wishes may be. 
This is a war to exterminate the reality of others as creatures with a point of view. 
A second kind of war is one in which one seeks to gain some limited and definite 
advantage that one has not been able to get by negotiations. The aim is to make the 
war more costly to the enemy than the loss of the disputed advantage. The third 
kind of war seeks to create among the enemy the desire for peace. To change the 
mind of the enemy is the object. The war is to be pursued with restraint. 29 
One may thus fight in a war and be detached from the force one wields if three 
conditions are met: (1) if one acts from necessity; (2) if one's intention is to per-
suade the enemy to desire peace; and finally, (3) if one pursues the war with re-
straint. One is then not identified with force or possessed by it because one does not 
seek to exterminate other points of view. How we are drawn into the chain of causes 
and effects by participating in social life, including war, determines whether we 
are present or absent in the action. We are "missing" when our allegiance is not 
given to exterminating other points of view , though we indeed seek to kill. We, so 
to speak, step outside the necessity in which social situations involve us by recog-
nizing that necessity with utter clarity, and by our restraining ourselves and not 
intending to exterminate other points of view or to gain a definite good or advantage 
for ourselves. 30 
To so act does not of itself raise one to a higher level. One has merely refrained 
from evil. But with detachment we have become a self which the ultimate reality 
can reach . We can be elevated to the level of righteousness through the soul's very 
love of the transcendent good in the form of Krishna, the incarnate Vishnu. Thus 
even war, if it is a necessity endured properly, can lead us into righteousness. In 
action, and not just by enduring suffering as a victim in obedience to God, we may 
find righteousness. In our participation in social life we are to do what we must do, 
knowing that such actions of themselves do not elevate us to righteousness. Our 
aim to be righteous thus remains intact. Our aim to be righteous is made evident by 
our love of righteousness itself, or by our love of righteousness present to us in 
Krishna. 
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On this interpretation detachment is not indifference. A person cares about 
the good in the pair "good-evil." He or she cares for the good of living and 
wants other people to enjoy life too. This is why the situation is one of duress. 
One must, therefore, fight desiring to live but with an awareness that one may 
be killed; and also to kill another with the desire that he live. This complex 
intention is captured by Weil through posing an imaginary situation. 
Supposing the life of a certain person were linked with our own to the 
extent that the two deaths had to be simultaneous, would we still wish 
that that person should die? If with our whole body and soul we desire 
life, and if nevertheless, without lying, we can reply 'yes', then we 
have the right to kill that person. Not otherwise. But is that sufficient? 
We must also desire that the other person should live, although necessity 
be opposed thereto.3' 
That this complex intention is extremely difficult to realize is no objection to its 
soundness because what we are talking about is achieving righteousness (or at 
least to refrain from evil) and righteousness is extremely difficult to achieve. 
Indeed in the Gila and in the Gospels, it is impossible to achieve righteousness 
without divine grace to raise us to it. 
Weil is thus very realistic about what is possible in war. From her own 
experiences as a combatant in the Spanish Civil War she writes, "Fear and the 
taste for killing. Avoidance of each of these-How? In Spain, this seemed to 
me a heart-breaking effort, impossible to maintain for long. Make oneself such, 
then, that one is able to maintain it."32 
For this reason Weil counsels us to enter into our hatred fully. "What we now 
hate, we shall manage to be able to love. We must feel our hate up to the hilt; 
know what it is we hate. Through each feeling, going downwards, to join up 
with the Atman. "33 This paradox makes sense when we realize that by their 
absence we can become aware of good (the good that is a member of the pair 
"good-evil") and the transcendent good. "Emptiness is the mode of existence of 
the objects of our desire. We only have to draw aside the veil of unreality and 
we shall see that they are given to us in this way. When we see that, we still 
suffer, but we are happy. "34 She tells us that "the remedy is to use the loss itself 
as an intermediary [metaxu] for attaining reality."35 Reality, which deprives us 
of good, frees the self of illusions caused by our appetites for that good which 
is a member of the pair "good-evil." Our hunger for good is a real desire not 
an illusory one. We touch the reality of ourselves in genuine desire. Thus in 
feeling hatred fully and being deprived of all good, we release the hunger for 
good. That desire is one which the ultimate reality may feed or, to put it another 
way, with that desire we are a self which the ultimate reality may find. 
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IV. Concluding Observations 
Throughout her Notebooks Weil voices her reservations with the Gita. She 
does not endorse all of it any more than she endorses all the Old Testament. For 
example, she mentions that dharma "is only suitable in a stable society. Those 
people did not draw up rules for unstable societies. What becomes of dharma 
in a conquered country? And what are the duties toward the conquerors? (Must 
find OUt)."36 In addition, she points out that Krishna is not an incarnation in the 
sense that Christ is because Krishna did not suffer. Krishna is a manifestation 
of deity (Vishnu is present) and so he is a revealer or enlightener. He is even a 
means of salvation (a metaxu). By loving him we can be raised to righteousness. 
But for justice itself to be incarnate entails suffering, and to be able to suffer 
requires that the divine become a creature. Among all the instances of alleged 
incarnations, Christ is the only one who suffered and suffered precisely because 
of his righteousness. We need not deny that Vishnu is one of the names of God, 
and that Krishna, as a manifestation of him, inspires, enlightens, and even 
enables people to reach the presence of righteousness itself in order to continue 
to maintain that Christ is the righteousness of God incarnate and that through 
Christ's suffering God suffers the separation of the Word from himself. 
We must, however, recall that part of Weil's method is to find important 
analogies or likenesses. We have seen that the universe and Krishna are not 
incarnations of the Word of God in the same way that Jesus is. On the other 
hand, Weil calls them incarnations because they are like his incarnation in vital 
respects. They function as metaxu or mediators between God and human beings. 
Contact between us and God, which is a "contradiction" since we are on different 
levels of reality, is made possible by God descending to our level. Thus the 
Word of God descends as the principle of nature's order and in human form in 
instances such as Krishna. In addition, incarnations such as Krishna's provide 
a saving revelation, that is, show and mediate a path to righteousness. The prime 
incarnation, that of Jesus Christ, however, reveals the full depths of God's saving 
mercy since it is the actual endurance of the suffering which is the cost of God's 
mercy toward human unrighteousness and which is borne by God himself. 
One other very serious reservation, which we noted in passing, is that the 
distinction between ultimate reality (God) and the universe is not clear in Hin-
duism. Attempts to clarify it have led to several schools of Hindu philosophic 
and religious thought. This lack of clarity affects the way salvation and incarnation 
are to be understood. As far as salvation is concerned, it is the difference between 
assimilation-being made like God, namely righteous (as in Christianity)-and 
identification with God (as in Hinduism). In addition, if there is an underlying 
ontological identity between the ultimate reality and human beings, salvation is 
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a realization of identity, not the gift of an immortal status and participation in 
the life of God by creatures. So for Weil there is no transmigration of the soul 
from body to body, a major stress of the Gita. As Weil put it, "Plato: assimila-
tion-India: identification. "37 As far as incarnation is concerned, if there is an 
underlying ontological unity between the ultimate reality and human beings, then 
an incarnation would not be a change in ontological status. In Christianity the 
divine and the creature are distinguished by the doctrine of creation ex nihilo. 
Only God is a necessary being, who is wholly sufficient in himself, in contrast 
to all else, which exists contingently, and which adds nothing to God's being. 
For the Word of God to become man is to change in ontological status. It is a 
degradation-to move from one grade to another-so that the Word of God now 
is a human being. 
For reasons such as these it is important that the exploration of a Christian 
theology of other faiths be pursued not only in terms of Christology, but in 
conjunction with studies such as David Burrell's in his comparisons of Roman 
Catholic, Jewish, and Muslim medieval philosophical theologians, whose 
common ground is Being. 3" The two approaches complement and interpenetrate; 
for were one to seek to study Being only, one would leave out the vital dimension 
of salvation in various religions. On the other hand, to examine salvation without 
the ontological dimensions of Being would be to fail to understand the nature 
of incarnation and salvation in Christianity and other faiths. 
This venture into a theology of other faiths raises in a new way the question 
of the nature of revelation. It is clear that neither Christianity nor Hinduism have 
faced every kind of human situation for which religious enlightenment is needed. 
No religion has shed as much light on the significance of being a victim as has 
Christianity with its claim that God incarnate is a victim. That perspective, 
however, needs to be complemented, as we have seen, by looking at righteousness 
from the point of view of one who acts. Our investigation thus opens up the 
possibility of developing new theories about the nature of revelation by allowing 
us to retain our Christian access to God in its full integrity while at the same 
time finding genuine revelation in other faiths, revelations which complement 
our own, just as our own complements theirs. But for this enterprise to be 
religiously and theologically fruitful it is necessary to approach other revelations 
from the point of view of seeking a Christian theology of other faiths. This 
contrasts with the approaches used by historians of religion, who seek to under-
stand other religions from the inside, so to speak, to understand them as they 
understand themselves. But theologians and Christians must also seek to under-
stand them from our point of view, from how they connect in vital ways to our 
understanding of God's revelation. And we might add that were a Hindu theology 
of other faiths attempted, we might then find a new appreciation of Christianity 
by Hinduism. The most ancient Vedas, accepted by all Hindus, has sacrifice as 
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their foundation. The Christian focus on God as the victim might open new 
vistas for that ancient faith. Rather than bhakti (love) as the place of contact 
between Christianity and Hinduism, it would lie in the oldest material of Hin-
duism, the Riga-Vedas. But it would also transform the notion of bhakti where 
one to think of love primarily in terms of a divine love that sacrifices itself for 
our redemption and does so from the very foundation of the world ("The Lamb 
of God slain from the very foundations of the world") so that there might be a 
world at all. 
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